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Abstract 
An escalating number of crises appear in the sport industry in general and the football 
industry in particular that make the area of crisis communication an increasingly important 
matter in both the everyday running and the long-term viability of football. However, the 
sensitivity of the topic makes an extensive analysis on crisis communications current practice 
a particularly challenging task. This study examines how crisis communications is managed, 
by investigating the current practices and techniques employed in English Premier League 
clubs, as they were presented by communications professionals employed in the clubs. The 
analysis of the clubs’ practices underlines the lack of pro-activity and presents the most 
popular strategies of crisis communications management; the “wait for the dust to settle” and 
the “react promptly before the noise grows”. In addition, an under-documented technique is 
examined: the use of the informal personal relationships between the employees of the clubs 
and the members of the media. This study also introduces the Crisis Communications 
Management in Football model, which illustrates the practices identified through this study 
and can potentially act as a guide for crisis communications analysis in a number of other 
industries. 
 
Keywords: Soccer, Premier League, crisis management, sport communication. 
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Introduction 
The business world encounters unexpected events of various forms and sizes on an everyday 
basis. According to Seeger, Sellnow and Ulmer (2003, as cited in Heath & Vasquez, 2004, p. 
54) an unexpected event can then transform into a crisis when its “overwhelmingly negative 
significance carries a high level of risk, harm and opportunity for further loss”. As the quote 
illustrates, an unexpected or unplanned event can potentially develop into a crisis of varying 
sizes that may bear harmful effects on both the short-term profitability and stability of a 
company and its long-term viability. One of the key elements of coping with crisis situations 
is managing the strategic functions of the company, such as communications, at any time 
(Coombs, 1999).  
Before presenting the focus of this study, a few clarifications will be made. Firstly, 
due to the complexity and potential subjectivity of the topic (e.g., size, reach, spread, focus 
importance, implications of a crisis; Booth, 2015), the definition provided by Seeger et al. 
(2003, as cited in Heath & Vasquez, 2004, p. 54) was adopted in this study. According to 
their work, a crisis is an unexpected event involving either an organization or particular 
individuals within it, whose significant negative impact can harm and cause loss to the 
overall organization. Secondly, when referring to a crisis event, there are legal and ethical 
aspects involved that will not be analyzed, since they exceed the aim of this study. 
Additionally, although there is a dense and compound relation between crisis management 
and communicating in a crisis, the study will present only the elements connected to the 
function of communication in regards with these escalated unexpected events. In more detail, 
the focus will be drawn on the ways in which the organizations/clubs manage their 
communications before, during and after a crisis.  
The football industry, often characterized as “scandalous and facing a crisis everyday” 
(Banks, 2002, p. 32), is an ideal example of an industry where crisis communications 
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management can be even considered a necessity. In light of the recent events occurring in a 
number of sports, such as the domestic abuse cases in the National Football League (Megdal, 
2014) and the match-fixing scandal in the Greek Super League (Manoli & Antonopoulos, 
2015), the sport industry in general and the football industry in particular are no strangers to 
crisis events. Nevertheless, there appears to be a lack of academic studies on the matter of 
crisis communications practices followed in the industry, as well as their efficiency, despite 
the growing popularity some of the sports leagues have  (it is estimated, for example, that the 
Premier League attracts the interest of more than 63 per cent of the global population - more 
than any other football league; Sportfive, 2014). In fact it could be argued that the few studies 
that examine crisis situations in sports, such as the ones by Bruce and Tini (2008), Wilson, 
Stavros, and Westberg (2008), and Trosby (2010) tend to focus on the crisis itself and the PR 
implications it might bear, while neglecting to examine the crisis communication 
management practices followed.  
It is this gap that the present research will aim to fill by examining the current practice 
in crisis communications management in football. In order for the researcher to provide an 
answer to this question, the focus will be drawn on the English football industry, and in 
particular the English Premier League clubs, which can allow for insights to be gained from 
industry leaders working within highly prominent organizations (as the study on Premier 
League’s popularity suggests; Sportfive, 2014). This study will therefore examine the 
communications management practices followed by the clubs that participate in the league 
during periods of crisis, as presented to the author by communications professionals 
employed by the clubs (the crises mentioned by the interviewees ranged from individual 
player/manager scandals (e.g., racist twitter comments, violent assaults, extramarital affairs), 
to organisation-wide threats (e.g., financial mismanagement, owner/sponsor facing business 
crisis). Through the data collected, the Crisis Communications Management in Football 
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model will be presented, mapping the practices encountered and potentially acting as a guide 
in understanding crisis communications in football. 
 
Literature Review 
This section sets out the main sources of literature which provide the basis of this study. It 
also presents the remarkably scarce literature available on crisis communications in sports 
and football. 
Common Styles of Crisis Communication 
A distinction often made when managing communications during a crisis is between the 
interest groups / stakeholders of a company (e.g., employers, customers, investors, local 
community, media, etc.), and the general public. Dividing the potential audience in two 
groups, stakeholders and general public, and further categorizing the former to smaller sub-
groups was an advice provided often to companies to help them possibly alter their 
communication messages, depending on the group that is receiving them, in order for a more 
audience-centric approach to be followed (Benoit, 1995a, 1997; Gouran, 1982). It was later 
suggested by various academics, such as Kheng-Hor (1998), Coombs and Holladay (2002), 
Coombs (2004), and Stephens, Malone, and Bailey (2005), that this practice could be rather 
inefficient when dealing with a crisis, since it could lead to mixed and confusing messages 
which can harm the long-term reputation of an organization. 
 According to the academic studies on the subject, companies today respond to a crisis 
in one of the following three ways:  
(a) To deny the existence of a crisis and refuse to cooperate with the media;  
(b) To provide incomplete and inaccurate information often reluctantly and delayed or;  
(c) To develop and sustain open and accurate communication channels with the 
environment and the press (Wilcox, Ault, Agee, & Cameron, 1998).  
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Most academics agree on the importance of the third approach (e.g., Coombs & Holladay, 
1996; Fink, 1986; Ramee, 1987; Ressler, 1982), which can yield better results in terms of 
public relations, image and brand management, relationship marketing and human resources 
management (Allen & Caillouet, 1994; De Beer & Coetzee, 2008; Rensburg & Barton, 2001; 
Sriramesh, Grunig & Dozier, 1996). 
Time Related Approaches of Crisis Communication 
According to Barton (1993), every crisis has five stages: detection, prevention or preparation, 
containment, recovery, and learning. Communication, in different forms, is an element of 
importance in all five stages and can even be the tool that will interrupt the progression of a 
crisis to its next stage. Another approach is the one outlined in the “Best Practices in risk and 
crisis communication” figure designed by Seeger (2006, p. 236) for the National Center for 
Food Protection and Defense, which comprises of three phases (“strategic planning”, 
“proactive strategies” and “strategic response”), as well as of a continuous evaluation and 
update loop. Although this particular figure was developed for the health industry, the 
guidance it provides can be implemented in most industries, as Seeger’s analysis suggests. In 
fact, it is the potential assistance a model like that could provide that informed the present 
research in designing the Crisis Communications Management in Football model that will be 
presented later on in this study. 
Following Millar and Heath’s (2003) study, coping with a crisis, both in terms of 
management and communication, has two distinctive stages; the pro-active and the re-active. 
Academics suggest that all advanced companies in any industry should be placing equal 
emphasis on developing both phases of coping with a crisis (Benoit, 2000; Collins & Porras, 
1997; Grunig, 1992).  
Pro-active, which means operating in advance, has a strong element of planning and 
speculating the often mentioned ‘worst case scenario’. Fearn-Banks (2007) suggests that this 
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hypothesis takes place in order for the crisis communication management plan to be 
generated. This plan is a part of the company-wide crisis management plan and could include 
details, such as selecting the spokes-person and deciding on particular aspects that should be 
covered in any future press release, in advance. By preparing strategically for a number of 
unexpected events and the course of action the company has to follow, the element of 
surprise in such an occasion can be significantly reduced. What Fearn-Banks is emphasizing 
through her work, however, is the consistent and coherent nature of the plan, in terms of 
involvement throughout the company. The proactive part of the communication function 
resembles the Risk Communication theory as discussed by Chess (2002) and Covello (1992) 
which includes the risk estimates and the possible consequences.  
Re-active practice is the line of actions taken after the breakout of the crisis, both 
before and after the media and the public become aware of it. In the re-active phase, the line 
of actions suggested depends on the specific crisis event and cannot always be generalized. 
However, some general guidelines seem to be apparent in all cases. For example, the 
importance of the company responding throughout the crisis coherently is emphasized though 
the work of Sellnow (1993) and Williams and Treadaway (1992). Their analysis provides 
examples of companies in which different departments reacted independently when a crisis 
occurred, such as Union Carbide and Exxon. As it was underlined in their work, both short-
term inconvenience and possible long-term reputation damage was caused due to the 
disjointed corporate image that was projected in these organisations. Advocates of the 
importance of the re-active actions include Marra (2000), who argues that detailed potential 
crisis communication plans can be poor predictors of a crisis and its results, if the company 
proves to be unable to react efficiently. What is also suggested by Pinsdorf (1999) is that 
outsourcing communications while experiencing a crisis might guarantee an efficient and 
prompt reaction. 
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Sturges (1994) argues in his study that the re-active role of communicating in a crisis 
should not have a defensive nature, as is commonly perceived. On the contrary, it should be 
informative rather than apologetic, while at the same time projecting the strong overall 
identity of the company. According to Seeger, Sellnow and Ulmer (2006), efficient 
communication in a crisis is the proof of control on behalf of the company that not only aims 
at reducing uncertainty, but also at maintaining or even enhancing the public perception of 
the company. Depending on the size and the effects of the crisis, strategies that are suggested 
in Benoit's image restoration theory (1995b), can be implemented within the company so that 
the communication function can be provided with further guidelines of action (denial, 
evading responsibility, reducing offensiveness, etc.). Millar and Heath’s (2003) study of the 
two distinctive stages of crisis communications has informed this present research, as it will 
be further discussed in the findings section. 
Crisis Communication in Sport/Football 
The sports industry in general and the football industry in particular have faced numerous 
crises of various nature and size. From individual players’ and managers’ personal and family 
scandals, to clubs’ financial problems and organizational structure issues, the industry has 
experienced unexpected events with high frequency, that have attracted considerable 
attention (Andreff, 2007; Barajas & Rodríguez, 2010; Clavio, Eagleman, Miloch, & 
Pedersen, 2007; Dietl & Franck, 2007). It has been pointed out with numerous examples 
(Smith & Elliott, 2007; Trosby, 2010; Wilson et al., 2008) that the crises taking place both in 
the wider sport industry and particularly in the football industry are of such frequency and 
variety that they require the constant attention of the organizations/clubs. The number, power 
and legitimacy of football’s interest groups (stakeholders) puts the industry under constant 
scrutiny and thus any conflicting interest between any of the parties involved can be a 
potential crisis (Manoli, 2014).   
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Depending on the industry the crisis takes place, different communication models 
have been developed that embody the unique characteristics of each business sector. For 
example, the “Best Practices in risk and crisis communication” model (Seeger, 2006, p. 236) 
discussed above, was created for the health business sector, to provide detailed guidance for 
companies and their communication departments in this industry. However, as it was 
mentioned earlier in this study, there does not seem to be a similar academic interest on crisis 
communications management in sport or football. The few studies available tend to focus on 
the analysis of the crisis itself (from a PR point of view) but not on the communications 
function (Elliott & Smith, 2006; Frick & Prinz, 2006; Gordon & Helal, 2001; Lago, Simmons 
& Szymanski, 2006), with only a few exceptions. These limited studies link crisis 
communications with PR and image management, focusing on either the sport organisations’ 
(Bilbil & Sutcu, 2008; Bruce & Tini, 2008) or the individual athletes’ (Bernstein, 2012; 
Brown, Dickhaus, & Long, 2012; Kristiansen & Hanstad, 2012; Trosby, 2010; Wilson et al., 
2008) image restoration practices. This lack of academic resources could be due to the fact 
that gaining access to such valuable and sensitive information as crisis communication can be 
exceptionally difficult.  
Having examined the main issues that emerged through the analysis of the literature, 
such as the proactive and reactive approaches to crisis communications, and the lack of 
relevant sources for the sports and football industry, the empirical research on crisis 
communications management in football will be presented. 
 
Method 
In order to examine the current practice of crisis communications in football, an empirical 
investigation had to take place. Firstly, the research sample was selected. Based on the wide 
disparity of organisations that operate within the realm of football in terms of structure, 
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finance, size and nature, the sample had to be reduced to the clubs of one league in one 
country, in order for potential hurdles to this research to be avoided. As a result, clubs 
participating in the English Premier League were selected as the sample of this study.  
Criterion purposive sampling (Myers, 2009) was employed in order to select the 
sample which consists of cases that share an important characteristic or set of characteristics, 
which in this study was that they ‘participated in the Premier League in any of the past five 
seasons’. Since at the end of each playing season, three of the 20 clubs are relegated from the 
Premier League to the Championship/second national division, while another three are 
promoted from the Championship to the Premier League (Szymanski & Valletti, 2005), this 
particular criterion assisted the author in acquiring information in relation to crisis 
communications practices in football clubs in that particular moment in time. Nevertheless, it 
is worth acknowledging that even within this sample disparities exist regarding the size (e.g., 
employees, resources, financial data, etc) and reach (current and potential fans, social media 
followers, etc.) of the clubs. 
Qualitative semi-structured interviews were selected for the collection of the primary 
data, since they provide more focus than the unstructured or informal approach, but still allow 
a degree of freedom and adaptability in getting the information from the interviewee. The 
interview research approach chosen was the emotionalist or subjectivist, which would allow 
the interviewees to draw on their authentic experiences of the current practice in the industry 
(Gubrium & Holstein, 2001). In more detail, the questions posed to the interviewees were not 
in the form of a questionnaire with multiple possible answers. On the contrary, an interview 
checklist with a number of open-ended questions was used, providing the interviewer with 
the flexibility needed in order to acquire the most information possible. A sample of the 
questions asked can be found in Appendix A. It is worth noting that in the beginning of each 
interview the interviewees were presented with the definition of crisis by Seeger et al. (2003, 
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as cited in Heath & Vasquez, 2004, p. 54), in order for the term to be clarified, limiting the 
potential subjectivity the topic might bear. 
The interviewees were selected carefully from the clubs of the sample. The 
Communication department was considered the suitable target, since it is the department in 
charge of communicating during a crisis, and thus employees of these departments in all 
Premier League clubs were contacted. A wide disparity can be noted between the 
departments of different clubs, which can employ from two to 12 people. It is also worth 
underlining that while communication is regarded as a separate department, the most senior 
employee of the communications team might not always bear the title of the Head of the 
department, mirroring in that way the fact that communications may not be considered such 
an important component to the club. Senior employees were chosen as ideal participants and 
were contacted using the researcher’s professional network of contacts. Since the researcher 
was at that time a Communication professional working within the football industry and the 
study was conducted purely for academic purposes, all interviewees were eager to offer their 
input. It is worth mentioning that the interviewees welcomed the idea of academic research 
on football communications and that the author was also encouraged to provide them with 
feedback on the crisis communication practices implemented in the industry. The researcher 
was able to secure interviews from the senior communications employees of 25 out of the 30 
clubs that participated in the Premier League in any of the past five seasons, that will be the 
sample of this study. 
The list of interviewees includes professionals such as clubs’ Head of 
Communications, Head of Marketing and Communications, Communications Director, etc. It 
is worth underling that not all interviewees were of the same management level, even though 
an effort was made for the most senior communications employee of each club to be selected. 
Due to interviewees’ inconveniences the author was directed to the next person in seniority 
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line in five clubs. The total number of interviews conducted for this research is 25 (one 
interview per club – Appendix B). 
An important factor when analysing the findings was for the author to produce a 
thorough study on the matters discussed with truthful and accurate information. For this 
reason, the interviewees were encouraged to give their honest opinion that would offer 
valuable and factual insight of the industry. In order for the author to include accurate 
information, the interviewees will remain anonymous and will therefore be referred to 
“interviewees” throughout the study, while any individual examples that could be linked to a 
particular club will be avoided. Due to the sensitivity of the matter under study, the 
researcher was often asked to stop recording the interviews when particular examples of 
crisis were mentioned (i.e. crisis incidents such as drinking and /or gambling or violent 
assault involving players or the manager or even financial scandals implicating the owner or 
any sponsors of the club); however, she was allowed to keep notes on the topics discussed.  
Based on the fact that the study does not aim to identify the details of each case, but the 
underling patterns among the clubs, it could be argued that this did not affect the quality of 
the data acquired.  
Efforts were made to conduct all interviews in person either in the offices or the 
training ground of each club, however, due to schedule inconveniences and time restraints six 
of them were conducted over the phone. Even though using telephone interviews could be 
considered a limitation to this research, based on the absence of visual cues which can result 
in loss of contextual and nonverbal data, telephones may allow respondents to feel relaxed 
and able to disclose sensitive information, which was proven useful for this study (Mayers, 
2009). 
The interviews took place between April and September 2014, with the duration of 
each one varying from 20 to 40 minutes. Since the interviewees were ensured of their 
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anonymity, the interviews were recorded (except from the moments in which the author was 
asked to turn off the recording) and later transcribed in order for their analysis to be 
facilitated. Finally, based on the relatively small number of data collected, no analysis 
software was used. Instead, the examination of the findings was done by the researcher based 
on reading thoroughly the transcribed interviews and isolating the information that would be 
relevant and valuable for the study through thematic analysis coding. In order for the validity 
and reliability of the study to be enhanced, intra-coding was used, which required the author 
to conduct the coding process twice in different times. Creswell (2013) suggests that this 
method eliminates the discrepancy or inconsistency that may occur while coding caused by 
the author’s mood, tiredness or meticulousness. Following intra-coding, inter-coding was also 
employed, and as a result the coding process was carefully and independently reviewed by an 
industry “insider”, in an attempt for an assessment on the interpretive process to be provided. 
The expert selected is an experienced practitioner who had worked in the football industry for 
a number of years (and had been previously employed in four of the clubs studied), as well as 
conducting research. Following their request, their anonymity will also be protected in this 
study. The “outside expert” consulted conducted independent scrutiny by coding samples 
individually and then comparing the points of agreement and disagreement. Taking both the 
intra and the inter-coding process into consideration, and after agreeing on the final codes, the 
themes identified in the data allowed the author to pinpoint and unfold the underling patterns 
of crisis communications in football clubs. During this procedure, the findings were re-
examined and verified with five interviewees (through additional discussions), in order for 
the author to be able to clarify the facts and hence reach sustainable conclusions that will be 
presented in the following section. 
 
Results 
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In this section, the clubs’ approach to a crisis will be examined, as provided by the 
communications professionals employed by the clubs. Based on the findings, a distinction has 
to be made regarding the time related approaches in football crisis communication. In more 
detail, the distinction will be made between pro-active and re-active communication actions, 
in line with Millar and Heath’s (2003) work. This distinction will help the reader better 
understand the current practice, while facilitating the author in presenting one of the key 
discussion points of the findings, the lack of pro-active crisis communication. As this section 
will show, the re-active crisis communication practices are substantially more than the pro-
active, with the latter category being often presented as “impractical” (Interviewee A) or 
“irrelevant” (Interviewee C) to football. In light of this, further analysis will be provided on 
re-active or post-crisis communication, with additional details on the most popular 
approaches. Finally, an important aspect of communicating during a crisis will be 
investigated; the relationship between clubs and the media, and how it can facilitate or even 
provoke a crisis.  
In order for the analysis of the findings to be facilitated, the main themes / codes that 
emerged through the data were used to map the current crisis communications practices in a 
figure. This Crisis Communications Management in Football model can be then used to 
illustrate the current practices and, thus assist in understanding and potentially improving 
crisis communications in the future.  
The analysis in this paper underpins the model outlined in Figure 1, whose 
development is discussed fully in the section that follows. In summary, to indicate its main 
features, the figure shows the very limited pre-crisis (proactive) communications actions on 
behalf of the clubs, which is illustrated with a dashed lined box in the figure. Following the 
unexpected event, an initial crisis evaluation takes place before the post-crisis course of 
action is decided (illustrated with a doted lined box in the figure). In terms of reactive 
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responses, two post-crisis communications strategies were encountered (“waiting for the dust 
to settle” and “stop the noise from its source”), with one approach favored over the other 
among football clubs as it will be further explored below. Leveraging the media relationship, 
a rather understudied technique that appears to be popular among PL clubs, precedes these re-
active steps, taking place before one of the two post-crisis communication approaches is 
chosen. Finally, depending on the reactive strategy selected, the respecting courses of action 
are followed. The model and its various steps (themes that emerged through the data) will be 
further explored in this section. 
###Insert Figure 1 here### 
Pro-Active versus Re-Active Approach 
As already identified by the literature review (Fearn-Banks, 2007), crisis communication has 
a two-fold nature; the pro-active and the re-active. Each approach is equally important in the 
overall communication of an organisation while facing a crisis and should not be excluded 
from the overall communication process. However, when examining football clubs’ practices 
one approach was clearly favoured over the other.  
Pro-active Crisis Communications 
As far as the pro-active state of the crisis is concerned, little practice exists in the majority of 
the football clubs. It is worth noting that all 25 interviewees, when asked about a crisis 
communication pro-active plan, used the words “not practical” and “impossible”. As 
mentioned by some of the interviewees, the planning of the “worst case scenario” situation 
takes place only when the possibility of it happening is considered high, while it tends to 
consist of only a few details on how it could be handled.  
 How can we decide on a plan before a crisis occurs? We cannot predict the future, 
and unfortunately, each crisis differs from the other. We have to deal with each crisis 
individually when it happens and see all its aspects in detail (Interviewee L).  
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In more detail, when the likelihood of an unpleasant event that can potentially be a 
crisis (e.g., relegation – example mentioned by Interviewee S) becomes considerable, the 
Director of Communications, Head of Media or Press Officer (depending on the club) has the 
responsibility of writing a Press Release after consulting with the Board of Directors. 
Depending on the event, its nature and size, the same person is also responsible to collect any 
information and details needed in order for the press release to be as accurate as possible. 
This release will then be sent to the media and published on the clubs’ own media (magazine, 
web-site, social media accounts, etc.), representing the opinion of the club. While, relegation 
can potentially develop into a crisis following a rapid snowball effect (players’ complaints, 
manager’s resigning, administration’s accusations, fans’ outrage, etc.; Banyard & Shevlin, 
2001), it is worth underlining that it was the only example of proactive crisis communication 
mentioned in all 25 interviews, by a single interviewee. Even when the interviewees were 
asked directly whether they should design a crisis communication management plan, their 
unwillingness to do so was explained as:  
It makes no sense to create a crisis communications plan. Should something happen, 
we’ll deal with it then. Trying to decide on a plan would only make sense if we knew 
the crisis or its nature. But we don’t. Each one is unique and unpredictable. It could 
start with a footballer’s Tweet or Facebook post, a newspaper’s article, the manager’s 
statements, anything. There is no plan that can capture that. (Interviewee V) 
This pro-active course of action was the only example mentioned in all the interviews 
regarding pre-crisis communication planning. In other words, drafting a Press Release when 
the likelihood of a potential crisis is very high is the only pro-active action taking place in 
football clubs according to the interviewees. That is because, as the interviewees put it, 
“crisis communication planning should not take place, unless a crisis is about to happen” 
(Interviewee A). As it was further justified, developing a communication plan when there is 
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no possibility of a crisis will only provide the club with false guidelines. So, since each crisis 
has unique characteristics, they should be firstly comprehended before the plan is created. 
This opinion resembles Marra’s (2000) view that crisis communication planning can be a 
poor predictor of the actual results, but is in absolute disagreement with the view expressed 
by academics such as Fearn-Banks (2007) who argue that pre-crisis communication planning 
can have a great effect on the overall management of a crisis. The lack of proactive planning 
is illustrated in the model with a dashed line. 
As explained by the interviewees, clubs believe that the pro-active communication 
planning of a crisis would not be functional and effective in football for various reasons. 
Firstly and most importantly, the unpredictability of the nature of each crisis requires 
different actions to be taken depending on the characteristics of each event, its nature and 
size, as well as the individuals involved. In most cases these characteristics are unique and 
bear many differences with previous occasions, which make planning and predicting 
impossible. 
An unpredicted event can be anything in the club. Something happens every single 
day that was not planned to happen. And it’s different every time, from something 
small to something big, we have unpredicted events occurring in all aspects of the 
club. How can we know which one will be tomorrow? (Interviewee U). 
Secondly, as it was argued by the interviewees, football players and managers have 
over time been the cause of numerous crises due to their unpredictable behavior, which 
provides football with a unique and great difficulty regarding pro-active crisis management 
and communication. From an unexpected decision to leave a club, to an unforeseen public 
action with social and legal consequences (e.g., violent assault, racist comments), players and 
managers make it challenging, if not impossible, for clubs to have a pro-active plan, as stated 
by the majority of the interviewees. The crisis examples available (from extramarital affairs 
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to gambling and drug use; Jones, 2008) can explain why interviewees felt that: “working with 
players is like working with a ticking bomb. You can’t predict when and how it will explode. 
There is no crisis plan that can manage that” (Interviewee P). 
Finally, the frequency in which crisis or unexpected events take place in football does 
not allow for planning to take place. According to the interviewees, the fast pace in which 
football clubs are functioning impedes the communications professionals from planning 
future actions, since their workload consists mostly or re-acting to unexpected and unplanned 
events and requests from various stakeholders of each club.  
The industry is moving in a running speed, we really don’t have time to plan. We 
spent 90% of our time fire-fighting rather than planning what to do next. Of course 
something might happen tomorrow, but we can’t plan for what to do then, since we 
must first respond to the things that happened yesterday, or this morning (Interviewee 
C). 
Reactive crisis communication 
As far as the re-active approach is concerned, as acknowledged by all the interviewees, the 
procedures followed after the crisis takes place are the main and most important part of crisis 
communication. The promptness and efficiency of those actions can have significant effects 
on the clubs’ both short-term operation and long-term reputation, as already studied by 
Sellnow (1993) and Wilson et al. (2008). The re-active course of action, as explained 
unanimously by the interviewees, does not follow a norm or pattern, but is designed 
depending on the nature and the size of the crisis, as well as the individuals that are involved. 
It is worth noting that the answer given by all 25 interviewees when asked about the 
communications re-action to a crisis or an unplanned event with potential to develop into a 
crisis included or was limited to the word “depends”. The actions are decided “depending on 
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the crisis in hand, how big or small it is, how much buzz it can create, who is involved, etc. 
There are a number of factors that dictate what has to be done” (Interviewee G).  
The individual in charge of crisis communications is again the Director of 
Communications, Head of Media or Press Officer. Their responsibilities include, after 
consulting with the Board of Directors and collecting all the information needed in order for 
an initial evaluation of the crisis to take place, to represent the club when needed, and 
communicate its opinion to both the media and the general public. This initial crisis 
evaluation includes an additional consultation with the legal and financial advisors, in order 
for any further implications to be assessed. During the post-crisis activity, efforts are made in 
order for the club to re-act as a group with a unanimous “voice”, which agrees with the 
suggestions of academics such as Coombs and Holladay (2002), Coombs (2004), and 
Stephens, Malone, and Bailey (2005). As it was argued, it is due to this emphasis on accurate 
representation that the Board is consulted before a response is decided. However, as some 
interviewees mentioned, due to the nature and the different and conflicting interests of the 
individuals involved, such an effort is considered difficult, if not impossible. In more detail, it 
was actually suggested that in some cases, it is even preferable to distance some members of 
the club from others or from the club in general (e.g., players, managers, sponsors from club), 
so that the club overall will be protected in terms of brand associations. It was argued that this 
initial crisis evaluation and the relevant consultations are conducted promptly (often through 
quick phone calls) and therefore do not impede or delay the course of actions that follow. 
This quick but vital step in crisis communications management is presented in a dotted line 
box between the crisis event and the reactive strategies that follow. 
What was also underlined as a vital factor of re-active crisis communication is the 
ability of the individuals employed by the club, as Grunig’s (1992) Excellence model also 
suggests. As emphasised by the majority of the interviewees, the ability and talent of the 
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club’s employees (Director of Communications, Head of Media, Press Officer, etc.) is a 
fundamental aspect when communicating in a crisis. As discussed in another study on the 
football industry (Manoli, 2015), it is the human capital rather than the business structure that 
provides the industry with the assets needed in order to function efficiently. In fact, as it was 
argued repeatedly by the interviewees, their skills are often overcompensating for the 
occasional lack of appropriately designed structures and protocols. 
Since each crisis requires individual and particular communication management 
according to the data collected, it would be challenging, if not impossible, for all individual 
post-crisis communication approaches to be presented. However, through the examination of 
the post-crisis practices presented by the interviewees two general themes / strategies or 
reactive response were identified and will be further analyzed below. 
Post-Crisis Strategies 
Regarding the general approaches on post-crisis line of action, two strategies were presented 
that bear no similarities between them. On the one hand, there is the idea that “today’s news 
is going to be yesterday’s news, tomorrow” (Interviewee D). As explained and supported by 
the majority of the football clubs (18 of the 25 of the sample), a large number of events that 
appear as significant crises at present are very likely to be insignificant news once the “dust 
settles” (Interviewee L). Due to the high volume of news that is broadcasted every day, the 
media and public’s interest are likely to focus on each event for a relatively small amount of 
time. So, by implementing patience and not re-acting spontaneously when an unexpected 
event that could potentially develop into a crisis takes place, the majority of the interviewees 
expressed certainty that the possibility of the media and public to be less interested in the 
details of it as time passes is very high. As explained in the following quotes:  
The media are always after the ‘hot’ news, the big story, however, their interest wears 
off quite quickly. People are the same, they’ll focus on the story for a nanosecond and 
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then move on. So what if there a personal scandal with a player? Tomorrow a new 
celebrity scandal will appear and the player’s transgression will be forgotten 
(Interviewee N).  
What you need to do is be patient. The storm passes really quickly, since another 
crisis will break out soon. Your footballer’s scandalous tweet will be forgotten, the 
moment the next player’s tweet appears. Just wait patiently and you’ll see the media’s 
interest shifting to another story (Interviewee S).  
Following this course of action, more information on the event can be collected and 
processed, providing each club with the opportunity to decide on any further future actions.  
In practice, this approach suggests that the club should not communicate the crisis to 
the media and the public but at a later point. In case the news of the crisis is communicated 
without the agreement of the club (through traditional or social media), the club’s opinion 
should not be given promptly, but after a considerable amount of time. As suggested: “In this 
way, if there is nothing official to write or talk about, chances are that they will soon stop 
talking about it altogether” (Interviewee X). As carefully explained by the supporters of this 
opinion, this approach is implemented only when there are no legal or financial implications. 
On the other hand, the opinion expressed by the minority of the clubs (the other 7 of 
the 25 of the sample), is that when a crisis is likely to attract significant media and public 
interest, thus “producing a lot of noise” (Interviewee M), by re-acting promptly when the 
news of the crisis is made public, the club has high possibilities to “stop the noise from its 
source” (Interviewee O). As clarified by the interviewees, a rapid and effective re-action can 
provide the media and public with information and details at a very early stage, that could 
prevent any speculation on the subject and its consequences. By addressing the subject 
punctually, the interviewees also believe that the public’s opinion about the club can be 
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effected positively, portraying the club as a united and well-functioning organisation and thus 
enhancing its reputation. As suggested:  
If you don’t provide the media or the public with an official statement or any kind of a 
clarification, they will keep writing and talking about it. And you never know what 
they might say. Soon, they will run out of information and might start speculating. 
Whilst by reacting quickly, you will be able to control what they talk about 
(Interviewee B).  
Responding promptly can take place both formally, through a Press Release given to the 
media or published through the official club’s media (website/magazine/TV/radio) and 
informally, through posts on the club’s social media accounts (Twitter/Facebook/mobile 
application). 
Both approaches presented, ‘waiting for the dust to settle’ and re-acting before the 
‘noise begins to grow’, were justified and supported passionately by the clubs. However, they 
seem to bear little relevance to what academics such as Fearn-Banks (2007) have suggested 
regarding a more strategic and well-planned approach to a crisis. In fact, it could be argued 
that the academic theory available does not provide the reader with a typology of common 
practices or even adequate information on how football clubs communicate after a crisis.  
Leveraging the Media Relationship 
Finally, an interesting crisis communication technique that is rather common in football will 
be presented; the use of informal personal relationships between the employees of the clubs 
and the members of the media. This technique resembles the personal relations between 
athletes and media discussed by Kristiansen, Roberts and Sisjord (2011), Kristiansen and 
Roberts (2011), and Kristiansen and Hanstad (2012), however, since the relation is built 
between the media and the club employees, the physiological aspects discussed by the 
academics do not apply in this particular context. Although this technique cannot be 
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described as a well-structured, clear and proper communications management method, its use 
in football has proven, according to the findings of this research, enormously useful.  
A defining aspect of reactive communication following a crisis, as underlined by all 
the interviewees, is the informal personal relationships clubs’ employees have developed with 
members of the local and national media. This type of relationship between individuals 
employed in the two industries exceeds the professional relationship between the football 
industry and the media, but can benefit the club on the occasion of an unexpected event. As it 
was argued by the interviewees, it is the personal and informal aspect of this relationship that 
differentiates it from the formal relationship formed between the employees of the two 
parties, which ensures that a more direct, prompt and efficient channel can be established.  
This relationship can be beneficial either in re-acting or even preventing a crisis. 
Regarding the former (re-acting), when a member of the media informs the clubs’ employees 
about the details of a story that could potentially develop into a crisis when publicized, before 
the story is actually made public, the club is provided with valuable time that can enable them 
to prepare for the re-active procedures. These procedures might include arranging Directors’ 
meetings and discussions with players, or even acquiring financial and legal advice. Most 
importantly, this additional time provides the club with the opportunity to re-act promptly and 
communicate having being informed fully of the details. A number of examples were 
mentioned by the interviewees as crises that they were informed of beforehand by the media. 
Most of these examples included players’ behaviour or actions (e.g., excess alcohol 
consumption, extramarital relationships) that were still made public, but the club was aware 
of the media’s intentions beforehand.  
When we get a phone call that the X player was spotted in a night club misbehaving 
the night before the match, we cannot get all the photos deleted, or make sure 
everyone who witnessed the event will not talk to the media. What we can do, 
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however, is find all the details from the player first, making sure we know who he was 
with, until what time, what they were doing, etc. It’s crucial we’re not caught off 
guard after a story is published and the player’s actions are all over the news 
(Interviewee Q). 
As far as the latter (preventing) is concerned, when information concerning the club 
can be a potential crisis if publicized, precluding their announcement to the public is likely to 
prevent the entire crisis. By informing the employees of the club about the forthcoming news 
and their potential consequences and by agreeing to not publish any information about it, 
some crises have been moderated or even avoided in the past. This technique of “stories 
exchange” (Interviewee E), as called by the interviewees, is simply the agreement that the 
members of the media will not publicize information on something, in exchange for 
information provided by the club on another subject that the media and public will be 
interested in. As explained by an interviewee:  
Sometimes reporters want to publish an exclusive, and a crisis can be a very good 
exclusive, indeed. But it is often that that they can be convinced not to publish an 
exclusive of crisis, if you can offer them another story, also exclusive, equally 
interesting, but with no crisis elements involved. You can give them, for example, an 
exclusive on a signing a day before anyone knows, in exchange of a drunk player’s 
misbehaving the night before (Interviewee O). 
This practice is based on the informal relationship formed between individuals and is 
relatively frequent in football, for both crisis and non-crisis communication management. 
Unfortunately, examples of the avoided crises mentioned above cannot be provided. It can be 
suggested, however, that based on the interviewees’ emphasis on this practice and its success, 
leveraging the relationship with the media to avoid a crisis is an efficient approach. Due to 
the fact that this practice is rather understudied, it is only after further research on the 
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efficiency of this step, that the short and long term effectiveness of leveraging the media 
relationship can be discussed.  
Even though leveraging the media relationship would require for proactive 
groundwork actions to take place (e.g., developing a relationship between the media and the 
clubs’ employees), its main use occurs after each crisis emerges and it is, therefore, presented 
as a reactive response step in the Crisis Communications Management in Football model.  
 It is worth underling that the above mentioned technique is very common in football, 
but only regarding the crises that would be communicated to the public through the media. 
Since the rise of social and new media, a more direct way of communication has been 
established that has limited the use of this technique. As a recent study by Brown and Billings 
(2013) shows, social media allow for sports fans to become crisis communicators themselves, 
ostracizing the media from the process and impeding the communications professionals from 
using this technique. However, as all interviewees argued, leveraging the media relationship 
is still considered a focal point of the crisis communications practice in the industry, even 
though it can be expected that its use will gradually reduce.  
Also, based on the long-term viability of crisis communications, it is worth noting that 
this technique relates directly to the informal personal relationships employees of the clubs 
have developed, which can be linked to the value of personal networks and social capital 
examined by Burt (1997), but which nevertheless does not translate into a club’s asset. 
Therefore, the individual’s network will remain their asset and will not be converted into the 
club’s asset should the employee-employer relationship seizes to exist.  
 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
Crisis communication management was chosen as the topic of this research due to its greater 
impact on the football industry, regarding corporate reputation and image management. 
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Whilst this research makes no claims of representativeness of the data sample in relation to 
the wider population of sport organizations, it does maintain that the new empirical material 
on crisis communications in football clubs and the Crisis Communications Management in 
Football module make a contribution to our understanding of how football and / or sports are 
communicating in case of a crisis. 
Discussion on Findings and Managerial Implications  
According to the analysis of the findings, the reader was presented with a thorough 
examination of the current practice of crisis communication in football. Firstly, the pro-active 
and re-active approaches were examined while underlining the lack of pre-crisis planning. 
Pro-active planning was in fact presented as impractical and unrealistic by the vast majority 
of the interviewees, who therefore disagree with the opinions expressed by academics on the 
matter. Unlike what the literature review suggests about other industries’ responses, football 
clubs appear to disregard pro-active planning when crisis communications are concerned. The 
unpredictability of each crisis’ characteristics was presented as the main reason behind the 
impracticality of planning, which only takes place when the possibility of a potential crisis is 
high. The frequency of unexpected events that could develop into crises and working with 
footballers and mangers were also presented as impeding factors in crisis communications 
planning. In particular, players and managers were presented as the most challenging 
category of individuals who, regardless the media training provided by the clubs, were prone 
to be involved or cause a crisis often and unexpectedly. While most industries do not work 
with footballers and managers, unpredictable and frequent crises can be considered a 
common phenomenon in other industries, as it was mentioned in the literature review. This 
could therefore raise a question on the football industry’s persistence to avoid planning, 
which could lead to a lack of strategic responses and an overall less efficient reaction. 
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Additional practitioner focused research is required in order for this question to be answered 
in detail. 
Also, the two main approaches regarding post-crisis communications were discussed, 
while presenting arguments for both the ‘wait for the dust to settle’ and the ‘react promptly 
before the noise grows’ strategies. The former more popular practice is followed by the clubs 
that believe that media’s and people’s interest on a crisis lasts for a very short amount of 
time, until another crisis appears. While the latter, less popular approach aims at addressing 
the issue the moment it is made public, so that any information publicised is accurate, and 
speculation is limited or stopped. Both approaches resemble practices followed in other 
industries, with the less popular approach being the one favoured by academics and other 
industries. Football clubs seem to favour a more patient and reserved approach, which does 
not allow for accessibility to the media and public. According to the interviewees, this 
approach allows for a more controlled reaction on behalf of each club, promoting a more 
coherent response, which might not have been possible if the club had responded right away. 
It is worth underlining that regardless of the strategy they follow, football clubs appear to be 
responding in an organisation-wide coherent and consistent way, thus presenting a ‘united 
front’ and protecting the long-term reputation of the organisation. 
Finally, a very common technique when communicating during a crisis was presented, 
the use of informal personal relationships between the employees of the clubs and the 
members of the media. This popular technique within football allows for news or stories to be 
‘exchanged’ with other information, in order for the details of an event not to be 
communicated to the public (immediately or at all), and therefore a potential crisis to be 
delayed, diminished or even avoided. Since this technique has yet to attract adequate 
academic interest its popularity and success in other industries is still rather understudied. 
According to the interviewees, however, it is one of the most popular and efficient techniques 
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that allows for communications professional to respond in crisis. Additional research on this 
technique is required in order for its short-term and long-term efficiency to be examined, 
while bearing in mind that the increasing use of new and social media has already created an 
additional hurdle in leveraging media relations, as discussed above. Since social media can 
allow for direct communication channels to be created between the fans and the athletes, and 
even permit fans to be the crisis communicators themselves, it could be argued that the need 
for athletes’ media and PR training in regards with crisis communication should be 
highlighted. 
Since the lack of research on crisis communication practices and the absence of a 
typology of approaches followed in the industry is the gap this research is trying to fill, the 
Crisis Communications Management in Football model is introduced, which illustrates and 
summarizes the key findings of this study. The model includes the two approaches presented 
by the interviewees, as well as the additional step – technique of leveraging the relationship 
with the media. This model illustrates the full process of crisis communications management 
in football clubs and can also act as a guide in order for the crisis communications practices 
in the wider sports industry, or in other industries, to be examined. As it has already been 
argued, crisis communications is an under-researched topic and therefore mapping the current 
practices can be a first step in appreciating it. 
An element that appears to be missing from crisis communications approaches in 
football, and respectively from the Crisis Communications Management in Football model, is 
the reflection or learning step that is underlined in practices in other industries. Evaluating the 
efficiency of a particular response could potentially lead an organization in identifying the 
most suitable approach, which can then be followed in the future. Once again, not including 
this step raises the question of lack of strategic focus in the industry’s response to a crisis, 
that can be answered following additional research. 
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As an overview of crisis communication management in football, the general 
guideline given unanimously by the interviewees is that since each crisis is unique, 
communicating cannot follow norms or patterns. Depending on its nature, size, characteristics 
and possible implications, as well as the individuals involved, the communication practices in 
the clubs are designed in a reactive and customized manner. Another key element of the 
findings, as presented by all the interviewees, is that currently, crisis communication in 
football is not based on a proper business structure or protocol, but on very capable 
communications practitioners. Since guidelines on various aspects are absent, it is often the 
employees’ initiatives and abilities that assure the well-functioning of the industry. 
Consequently, it is the human assets that enhance the efficiency of communications in the 
football industry at the moment and not its business structure and well-established 
techniques. 
Research Limitations  
In terms of sample size and integrity, a limitation arises from the effect of promotion and 
relegation within football leagues. Efforts have been made to select an accurate and 
representative sample of the league for this study. The number of the clubs included in the 
sample, 25 out of the 30 that participated in the Premier League in any of the past five 
seasons, with some participating in it ever since its beginning, and thus it could be argued that 
increasing the size of the sample would not add significant value to the research piece. 
Additionally, due to further inconveniences, as it was mentioned in the methodology 
section, the interviewees were not all of the same management level or position, and thus the 
information that some were able to provide was not as detailed as the data given by others. 
Nevertheless, all the interviewees are employed under the wider department of 
communications, which is the department in charge of communicating during a crisis.  
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As far as the qualitative method of this study is concerned, concerns can be raised on 
any efforts to generalise the findings. However, as it was underlined in the introduction of the 
thesis, the aim of this research was not to generate findings that could be generalised to a 
winder population in a statistical sense. On the contrary, this study aimed at offering rich 
insights regarding crisis communications in football clubs, by detecting patterns in the data 
that can be conveyed to similar settings. Additionally, a number of actions were taken in 
order for the trustworthiness of the data collection and analysis to be ensured, including 
member checking, intra and inter-coder agreement. Additional details on the actions 
employed to reduce potential limitations and increase the reliability and validity of this study 
were provided in the methodology section.  
Another limitation, as far as presenting and analyzing the findings is concerned, is the 
accuracy and truthfulness of the information acquired. As discussed above, in order for the 
data to be presented in the most accurate way, the anonymity of the interviewees has been 
maintained in this study and neither the transcribed interviews nor the full list of interviewees 
can be provided. Additionally, excluding any particular crisis examples that were mentioned 
in the interviews but could be linked to an individual club could be considered a limitation, 
however, it was considered a necessity due to the sensitivity of the topic discussed.  
Future Research Implications  
Having provided an answer to the aim of this study through an extent analysis of crisis 
communication management in football, this paper can now set the basis for future research 
on the matter. The lack of pro-active crisis communication and the belief of its 
ineffectiveness in football could be further investigated with the use of observation over a 
period of time and considering real-time practitioner decisions in relation to the academic 
believes and findings that planning proactively can assist.  
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Additionally, the process of crisis communication could be further examined in search 
for the best practice (structure and techniques) in football. By investigating each club 
individually with the aim to provide a benchmarking measure, best and worst practice cases 
could be presented. These cases could then act as a guideline for future practice in the 
industry. Also, the effects of the two post-crisis approaches presented above could be further 
explored, with more emphasis put on their long-term effects. 
Examining the potential application of the Crisis Communications Management in 
Football model in different similar or less similar contexts, could also allow for additional 
light to be shed on crisis communications. For example the model’s potential implementation 
in a wider sporting context or in different country context could be investigated in future 
research, that could be influenced by dissimilar sporting cultures and different country 
contexts, where significant variations and differentiations in the practices might be 
encountered. Equally, in the wider context of industry sectors, crisis communications should 
be studied in organisations operating in similar or less similar sectors, which are based in less 
developed and non-English speaking countries. 
Bearing in mind the current prominent role of social media in the way in which news 
is disseminated, additional research could also be conducted on the current role of traditional 
media in crisis communications. Examining whether their role has decreased or transformed 
could allow for a more thorough view on the communications practices to be provided, while 
linking it with the methods and ways in which football clubs are managing it.  
Finally, the football industry or the wider sports industry can benefit from additional 
research focusing on cross-case comparisons between sports, or even among various other 
communications functions and crisis communication. In this way, professional sports could 
be provided with the opportunity to further develop towards a more mature managerial 
approach which could prove beneficial for their future. 
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Appendix A: Interview questions / checklist 
• Have you encountered a crisis while working for the club? 
• How often does a crisis take place?  
• What is your role in a crisis? 
• What is the line of action in communicating when a crisis occurs? 
• Can you walk me through what happens communication-wise? 
• Is there a plan for communicating in crises? If no, why? If yes, can you give me 
details about it? 
• Are there any actions taken before a crisis takes place in order to prepare you/the team 
for when a crisis comes? If no, why? If yes, can you give me details about it? 
• Has there been an attempt to create a plan on how to communicate in a crisis? 
• Do you believe a plan would help? Why? 
• Once a crisis takes place, what is the club’s communication practice?  
• How is crisis communication organised? Who leads? Are there any particular steps 
that are followed? 
• Is it the same for all crises? Are there any patterns / particular practices you follow? 
• Is there a crisis communications strategy? 
• What role do the media play in crisis communications? 
• How close is your relationship with the media? 
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Appendix B: List of interviewees 
The clubs are presented in the chronological order in which the interviews took place. 
Club Role Seniority within the football club 
A Marketing and Communications Manager Head of department 
B Head of Marketing and Communications Head of department 
C Head of Communications Head of department 
D Communications Director Head of department 
E Communications Manager Middle management 
F Communications Manager Middle management 
G Head of Communications Head of department 
H Communications Director Head of department 
I Marketing and Media Manager Middle management 
J Communications Executive Middle management 
K Communications Manager Middle management 
L Head of Communications Head of department 
M Online Marketing and Communications 
 
Head of department 
N Head of Communications Head of department 
O Communications Director Head of department 
P Head of Communications and Media Head of department 
Q Head of Communications and Marketing Head of department 
R Communications Director Head of department 
S Head of Communications Head of department 
T Head of Communications and Marketing Head of department 
U Head of Communications and Media Head of department 
V Head of Communications and Marketing Head of department 
W Communications Manager Head of department 
X Communications Director Head of department 
Y Communications Director Head of department 
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Figure 1. Crisis communications management in football 
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